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Abstract
This review explores contributions by science policy studies and the sociology of
science to our understanding of the impact of governance on research content.
Contributions are subsumed under two perspectives, namely an “impact
of”—perspective that searches for effects of specific governance arrangements
and an “impact on”—perspective that asks what factors contribute to the
construction of research content and includes governance among them. Our
review shows that little is known so far about the impact of governance on
knowledge content. A research agenda does not necessarily need to include additional
empirical phenomena but must address the macro-micro-macro link inherent to the
question in its full complexity, and systematically exploit comparative approaches in
order to establish causality. This requires interdisciplinary collaboration between
science policy studies, the sociology of science, and bibliometrics, which all can
contribute to the necessary analytical toolbox.
Keywords: Project-based research funding; Performance-based funding; New public
management; Academy-industry relations; Scientific innovations; laboratory
studies; Undone science; Research content.
1. Two fields, too little interaction
W I T H T H I S R E V I E W , we want to explore contributions by
science policy studies and the sociology of science to our understanding
of the impact of governance on research content. This is not a straight-
forward task because the two fields are usually considered as separate
and moving apart rather than converging. Recent reviews of science
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policy studies, or science policy and innovation studies, see them as
detached from the sociology of science [Martin 2012; Martin et al.
2012; Trousset 2014]. Jasanoff’s [2010] perspective is an exception
because she sees both fields as belonging to the large interdisciplinary
enterprise of science, technology and society (sts) studies, albeit
without specifying any interactions between the fields that would
justify this assessment. Bibliometric studies regarding mutual citations
found relatively few such cases, and agree that the sociology of science,
science policy studies and bibliometrics have moved apart since the
1970s [Van den Besselaar 2000; Van den Besselaar 2001; Bhupatiraju
et al. 2012]. This separation is confirmed by the limited impact of a first
attempt to establish a political sociology of science [Blume 1974], of an
attempt to link science policy decisions on research funding to the
interests of science studies [Cozzens 1986], and of the attempt to re-
open a dialogue between bibliometrics and the sociology of science
[Leydesdorff 1989]. A more recent attempt to revive the idea of
a political sociology of science [Frickel and Moore 2005b] appears to
be more successful, possibly due to the intense interest in politics
developed by “STS as movement” (Rip 1999; for an illustration see
Woodhouse et al. 2002). However, the initiators of this revival also
observe that the “new political sociology of science” constitutes
a separate body of scholarship [Frickel and Moore 2005b: 7].
There are scientific reasons for this separation between sociological
and policy studies of science. The sociology of science went through
several “turns”, all of which have in common a micro-sociological focus
that became increasingly difficult to integrate with the macro-level
concerns of science policy studies and bibliometrics. Communications
turned inwards as the two fields grew apart and evolved. The sociology of
science is part of what is called sts and appears to include the sociology of
scientific knowledge and a “new political sociology of science.” Science
policy studies are considered part of science and innovation policy studies
or science and technology policy studies. Although the two fields share
many empirical objects and some empirical methods, they differ in their
research interests, approaches and framing of results. While we feel
unable to resolve the terminological diversity, we can start from the
observation that there is a stream of research focusing on the effects of
policy processes and a stream of research focusing on the construction of
scientific knowledge, which both are sufficiently well integrated internally
to be considered as fields.
One reason why the two fields should talk to each other is the
existence of the common research question that motivates our review.
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How does governance change research content? This question ad-
dresses a causal chain (more precisely, a web of causal links) that
connects the domains of both fields. It is sufficiently complex and
challenging to require a combination of expertise and efforts, and
needs to be answered by both fields. Science policy studies must
answer it because most of the policy processes studied aim at changes
in the direction or quality of research. Conversely, sociological studies
of links between conditions and outcomes of the social construction of
scientific knowledge miss an important factor shaping knowledge if
the governance of science is excluded from scrutiny.
The need to include factors from the domain of the other field has
occasionally been admitted.Mayntz and Schimank [1998: 753] argued that
in order to understand the mechanisms that channel external expectations
towards science, the “performance level of the science system” needs to be
included in the analysis of policy processes.More recently,Miller andNeff
[2013: 299] confirmed that this remains a lacuna by noting that “[p]robably
in part of the inherent messiness of the inner-workings of scientific
communities and their settings, most S&T policy scholars have focused
primarily on evaluating the inputs and outputs of science.”
For the sociology of science, Cozzens noticed as early as 1986:
The primary reason for undertaking policy relevant research in science studies is
that it focuses our attention in a powerful way on an important institutional
context of contemporary science which is relatively neglected in our work. The
problem is not that we ignore science policy entirely, but rather that we do not
take it systematically into account. Sociologists sometimes address their
research to policy issues, but they have seldom taken the role of government
agencies in scientific development as problematic in itself [Cozzens 1986: 9-10].
About ten years later, other sts scholars noticed a neglect by the
sociology of science of macro-structures and dominant institutions
[Knorr-Cetina 1995b: 160-163; Kleinman 1998: 285-291; Nowotny
2007: 485]. This is not to say that sts scholars do not engage with
science policy. They do so frequently and with a variety of interests.
However, “politicizing science” (see Brown 2015 for an overview of
this research area) is different from systematically investigating the
impact of science policy on the construction of scientific knowledge.
The latter appears to occur only in the few studies focusing on such
influences (e.g. Kleinman 1998) or “if outside events intrude on the
micro level” and “an STS person is around to notice” [Nowotny 2007:
485; referring to Webster 2007: 463-466]. The “new political sociology
of science” illustrates rather than alleviates the problem that most
studies of science appear to be interested in or able to investigate either
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governance or research content but not the link between the two
[Frickel and Moore 2005a].
Although both fields consider themselves thriving, we would argue
that the separation of foci on the production of research content and
the politically shaped conditions for this production unnecessarily
hinder the exploration of an important research topic. The aim of this
review is therefore to discuss opportunities for an integration of
science policy studies and sociology of science perspectives on the
impact of governance on the content of research.
Setting out to explore contributions to a specific research question
makes this review rather old-fashioned. We do not apply semi-automatic
(keyword- or journal-based) download and mapping procedures that
have gained ground in reviewing [Martin 2012; Perkmann et al. 2013;
Trousset 2014]. Instead, we used our own knowledge of the literature
and conducted a problem-driven search that relied on snowballing from
references. In addition, we scanned the volumes of some major journals
(Minerva, Science and Public Policy, Research Policy, Social Studies of
Science, Science, Technology and Human Values) from 2010 to 2015.
This approach is risky because the STS and Science Policy
literature is voluminous and scattered, and we apologise in advance
for having overlooked important contributions. We are confident not
to have missed whole research agendas and prefer risking incomplete-
ness and one-sidedness of some judgements but providing a perspec-
tive that can be challenged, corrected and built on by others. In
particular, we believe that this treatment of the literature leads to
a clearer picture of research desiderata.
Our focus on empirical studies of linkages between governance and
research content reveals that there is no clear separation of empirical
domains or methods. While most applications of quantitative methods
and most macro-level studies can be linked to science policy research,
and sts studies mostly use qualitative methods at the micro-level,
there are significant overlaps. However, two different perspectives on
the causal link between governance and research can be distinguished.
An “impact of”-perspective asks about the effects of specific gover-
nance arrangements and employs a wide range of methods to trace
“pathways of impact” in order to identify changes in researchers’
behaviour or changes in research content caused by these governance
arrangements. In contrast, the “impact on”-perspective focuses on the
construction of scientific knowledge and asks how scientific knowledge
is shaped and what factors contribute to this shaping. Our organisation
of the review follows this distinction, bearing in mind that, like all
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others, this categorisation is imperfect, not least because it creates an
apparent imbalance between science policy and sociological studies by
including many sociological contributions in section 2 and reserving
section 3 for studies that consider heterogeneous influences on research
content. In terms of conclusions, we outline a research agenda.
2. What are the effects of governance on research content?
In this section we look at studies that take (changes in) the
governance of science as their point of departure, and analyse their
impact on the production of scientific knowledge. We focus on four
major changes in the governance of science that have occurred in most
oecd countries over the last decades, namely:
- the transition from recurrent funding of research to a split funding
mode that combines recurrent funding with temporary project-
based support;
- the incorporation of public policy goals in science policies;
- the transformation of governance of higher education systems that is
commonly referred to as a transition to “new public management”; and
- the encouragement of knowledge transfer activities and collabo-
ration between publicly funded research and commercial enter-
prises [Whitley 2010].
Science policy studies have responded to these observations by
analysing the impact of new funding arrangements including the new
role of funding councils (2.1), the promotion of emerging fields and
contributions to solutions of societal problems by state-funded re-
search programmes (2.2), the consequences of performance-based
block funding of universities and public research institutes (2.3), the
impact of higher education reforms (2.4) and changing patterns of
academy-industry collaborations (2.5).
The allocation of publications to these thematic areas required three
difficult decisions. First, these major trends are by no means the only
changes in the governance of science. There are many more, and some of
these can be considered as potentially widespread and influential. We
selected research linked to the five trends because we believe it to be
representative of the way in which the impact of governance on research
content is studied and because they encompass the major channel through
which authority over research content is exercised, namely funding.
Second, we had to allocate each study to one of the themes although
121
governing science
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975616000047
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universitaetsbibliothek, on 26 Oct 2017 at 10:33:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
they obviously overlap. For example, state policy goals are realised
through the governance of research councils, the regulation of univer-
sity-industry relationships, or higher education reforms. We solved this
problem by assigning studies to one theme and cross-referencing them
when necessary. Third, limiting the analysis of governance to dominant
trends might make us overlook emerging issues, which is why we devote
a section to recent developments whose scope and effects are currently
difficult to assess (2.6). After presenting major ideas of research on the
effects of governance, we will identify the common problems and
methodological challenges of these approaches (2.7).
2.1. Transition to split funding modes and the rise of competitive project
funding
The transition from exclusive block funding of research organisa-
tions to a split funding mode that combines block funding with project
grants is one of the most important changes in the governance of
research. Although the initiation and speed of this institutionalisation
varied greatly between countries, its impact on research in many fields
has been severe. In fields that depend on external project funding,
researchers compete not only for recognition of their research but also
for the opportunity to continue research at all. In the governance
system, research funding agencies have emerged as powerful new
actors that affect the direction of research.
These changes have enjoyed considerable attention in science
studies. In particular, funding agencies have been studied in some
depth because of their unique role and growing influence in the science
system. They were considered as intermediary organisations that
mediate between science policy, scientific communities, and researchers
who apply for and receive grants [Braun 1993]. Later, the concept of
“boundary organizations” was introduced by Guston [2001] in order to
emphasize their active role in mediating between policy and science (see
also Kearnes and Wienroth 2011). Principal-agent theory has been
suggested as a theory that can explain structures of and processes in and
around research councils [Braun 1993; Rip 1994; Guston 1996; Braun
1998; Van der Meulen 1998; Braun and Guston 2003; Caswill 2003],
but has been criticised for not being able to do justice to the complex
embeddedness of research councils [Morris 2003; Shove 2003].
The analyses of research councils as intermediary organisations include
only very few general comments on their influence on the content of
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research. Braun [1998] makes a convincing theoretical argument that it is
possible to influence the cognitive development of science through research
council funding (see also Rip 1994). How this influence occurs, and how
specific changes of research content are achieved, has not yet been
explored in any depth. Instead, research has focused on the process of
selecting proposals for funding. Changes in research content have been
treated indirectly as outcomes of these selection processes, if at all.
The consequences of decision-making by peer review for the
content of research have been a concern of science studies ever since
the first study of peer review at the nsf, which found the likelihood of
having a grant approved did not differ from a random selection (Cole
et al. 1981; for a recent review see Van Arensbergen et al. 2014). Later
discussions held peer review decisions to select “excellent medioc-
rity”, i.e. good but not excellent research, mainstream research, and
low-risk proposals [Chubin and Hackett 1990; Travis and Collins
1991: 336; Horrobin 1996; Berezin 1998].
The increasing relative scarcity of research funding has triggered an
“excellence turn” in science policy, namely attempts to fund research
with the potential to transform or significantly advance its field. These
attempts manifest themselves in new funding programmes, whose
implementation challenges peer review to identify exceptional research
(which is variously termed “excellent”, “breakthrough”, or “performa-
tive”). Contrary to the above-mentioned findings and beliefs that peer
review is incapable of promoting exceptional research, appropriately
“conditioned” peer reviews appear to be able to identify exceptional
research. Studies of decision-making procedures in peer review have
identified the conditions and practices supporting the identification of
exceptional research [Dirk 1999; Guetzkow and Lamont 2004; Heinze
2008; Luukkonen 2012]. Funding programmes that utilise peer review
for the selection of “excellent” research proposals have been shown to be
able to identify research leading to scientific innovation or research that
was categorised as “excellent” by independent experts [Lewison 1999;
Lal et al. 2011; Wagner and Alexander 2013; Laudel and Gl€aser 2014].
Researchers were also interested in the responses of peer review
processes to the thematic heterogeneity of grant proposals. Within
reviewers’ fields of expertise, Travis and Collins [1991] observed
“cognitive cronyism”, i.e. a bias of assessors towards their own
scientific perspectives. Lamont [2009] and Huutoniemi [2012] iden-
tified several strategies that members of interdisciplinary panels use in
order to achieve consensus. In interdisciplinary social sciences and
humanities panels “deferring to expertise”, i.e. the delegation of
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decisions to panellists who belong to the fields addressed by a proposal,
appears to be common [Lamont et al. 2006]. Langfeldt [2001]
observed discipline-specific interpretations of general guidelines for
evaluations.
A separate, more recent strand of bibliometric research turned to the
question whether peer review does indeed select the best applicants
[Bornmann et al. 2008; Van den Besselaar and Leydesdorff 2009;
Campbell et al. 2010]. Unfortunately, the methodology of these studies
seems questionable for three reasons. First, they contrast peer review
decisions on grants with bibliometric measurements (publications and
citations) of applicants’ pre-grant or post-grant performance, which
provides very little information unless one is prepared to accept biblio-
metric indicators as more valid performance measures. Second, successful
applicants are often compared to unsuccessful applicants, i.e. a control
group that is inherently problematic [Neufeld and Hornbostel 2012].
Third, reducing the independent variable in studies of success to the award
of one particular grant does not do justice to the complexity of funding
situations. It is not entirely clear what this kind of study contributes to our
knowledge about the impact of funding councils on research.
In contrast to this emphasis on selection processes, only very few
studies actually investigated changes in the content of research due to
the (anticipation of) peer review decisions. The only major exception
is the link between competitive grant funding and research perfor-
mance which has been investigated primarily in the context of
evaluations of funding programmes. Studies of grant-funded individ-
uals and research centres provide mixed evidence [Gaughan and
Bozeman 2002; Jacob and Lefgren 2011; Neufeld and von Ins 2011;
Neufeld and Hornbostel 2012; Neufeld et al. 2013; Bloch et al. 2014;
Langfeldt et al. 2015]. It turns out that researchers receiving fellow-
ships and “centers of excellence” do not necessarily produce better
research than comparable researchers or centers without such funding.
The only interesting finding in this context is that the award of
prestigious grants is not associated with increased research perfor-
mance but is associated with increased career success [B€ohmer and Ins
2009; Bloch et al. 2014].
An important observation that challenges the whole idea of
competition for funding leading to better research was contributed
by Butler and Biglia [2001] in a study that, unfortunately, is difficult
to find. Butler and Biglia found that while Australian research
funded by grants from the National Health & Medical Research
Council did indeed have a higher citation impact than unfunded
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research, research that did not have to rely on grants at all because it
was funded by block grants had the highest impact [ibid.: 13-14]. In
a similar vein, Auranen and Nieminen [2010: 831] find no clear
causal link between the degree of competition in a science system and
its publication performance and efficiency.
The few studies that attempt to identify thematic changes caused
by research council funding are based on interviews and mostly rely
on behavioural changes reported by interviewees. These studies
appear to confirm an earlier observation that the “fundability” of
a proposal is firmly integrated in considerations of “do-ability”
[Fujimura 1987]. Researchers respond to priorities set by funding
councils and to their perception of peer review being biased towards
mainstream and low-risk research [Morris 2000; Gl€aser et al. 2010;
Leisyt _e et al. 2010]. Although window dressing plays an important
role in attempts to secure funding, the thematic priorities and
decision-making practices of funding councils do have an impact.
Both the selection processes and their anticipation by researchers
result in the latter orienting their research more towards mainstream,
low risk, and applied topics. In addition, grant funding appears to
hinder changes of research topics because selection processes favour
proposals that are linked to applicants’ prior expertise. Researchers
must “bootleg” money for the start of new research under the cover
of existing grants [Hackett 1987: 143; Morris 2003: 364-365; Laudel
2006: 496; Gl€aser et al. 2016].
Thus, while grant funding increases the flexibility of a science
system and supports the concentration of resources on the best
performers, little is known about its effects on the content of research.
Adherence by researchers to topics that can be expected to be funded
may reduce the diversity of fields on the macro-level, may force them
into specific directions, and may hinder rapid innovation. The
“excellence turn” in science policy can be interpreted as a response
to this concern. However, too little is yet known about the “pathways
to impact”, the actual adaptation of research by researchers and
research groups, and aggregate effects of such adaptation. For
example, we know very little about those who lose in competitions
for grant funding. What happens if researchers who need grants to
conduct their research are unable to win any? There are some hints at
low-level research of reduced validity and reliability [Laudel 2006;
Gl€aser et al. 2010] but, by and large, we just do not know.
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2.2. Incorporation of public policy goals in science policies
and the rise of targeted funding
Since the middle of the previous century, science policy has begun
to incorporate public policy goals in an attempt to increase the
contribution by science to solutions of societal problems [Remington
1988; Behrens and Gray 2001: 179-180; Lepori et al. 2007; Hessels
et al. 2011; Berman 2012; 2014].1 Roughly at the same time, science
outgrew the opportunities to fund its growth, and science policy began
to face decisions about what science to fund [Cozzens 1986]. As
a consequence, expectations for science to provide specific knowledge
content have been significantly enhanced, and have been inscribed in
evaluation and funding procedures. Funding councils have incorpo-
rated such priorities into their procedures for allocating project
finance in various ways (see e.g. Kearnes and Wienroth 2011 on the
responses of the UK’s Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council to state expectations). In addition, many states have become
more directly involved in supporting research in particular areas for
policy purposes. This is why effects of this trend on the content of
research are partly included in considerations of the impact of project-
based funding (2.1), and higher education reforms (2.4) and academy-
industry links (2.5). In this section, we consider the impact of state
investments in “emerging fields”.
The trends described above created the need for science policy to
fund research selectively. Scientists responded to this new funding
strategy by casting their fields and topics as particularly promising.
The intersection of these trends has been described as the emergence
of “strategic research” and “promissory science”. The former concept
refers to “basic research carried out with the expectation that it will
produce a broad base of knowledge likely to form the background to
the solution of recognised current or future practical problems” [Rip
and Voß 2013: 41; see also Van Lente and Rip 1998; Rip 2002]. The
latter concept was used by Hedgecoe [2003] to refer to the promises
researchers make in order to attract support for what they rhetorically
construct as a promising field. This echoes the observation of
a “promise-requirement cycle” according to which promises made
by scientists in order to secure funding become institutionalised as
1 The incorporation of public policy goals
in science policy is of course not completely
new, as military research most strikingly
illustrates. We follow Whitley’s [2010]
argument that scope, modes and effects of
this incorporation have changed significantly
since the 1970s.
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expectations on which fields have to deliver [Rip 1997: 628-632]. Rip
also pointed out that the attempts to raise state interest and employ
science policy in the funding of research has furthered the use of
“umbrella terms” (terms of unclear scope) because these terms are
useful in gaining support for scientific enterprises that cannot yet be
precisely described. Umbrella terms also serve to suggest integrated
efforts where they do not exist. In her study of materials science,
nanotechnology and synthetic biology, Bensaude-Vincent [2016: 54]
confirms that researchers in these interdisciplinary “fields” “still
remain strongly grounded in their referent disciplines” (for nanotech-
nology, see also Marcovich and Shinn 2014).
This basic constellation has been studied for many emerging
“fields”, “technologies” or topics, among which nanotechnology is
probably the most studied and synthetic biology is probably the most
recent example [Molyneux-Hodgson and Meyer 2009; Bensaude-
Vincent 2016]. Science policy studies of emerging fields usually focus
on the emergence of political priorities and funding instruments
through interactions between scientists and political actors (e.g. Eisler
2013) or on the role of community-building funding instruments (e.g.
Molyneux-Hodgson and Meyer 2009). The impact of the governance
of emerging fields on the content of research has not yet enjoyed much
attention.
While it is clear from studies of emerging fields that state interest
contributes to the formation of fields and rapid growth, and that
scientists attempt to exploit these new opportunities, we do not know
how and with what results massive state investment changes the
content of research. There can be little doubt that in addition to the
window dressing triggered by targeted funding, such funding also
increases research on the intended topics. Far less is known about the
details of thematic changes. The few studies addressing responses to
state funding hint at a complex picture that involves many intervening
variables. For example, Leydesdorff and Gauthier [1996] compared
responses by Dutch and Canadian scientists to “national innovation-
oriented research programs”. They concluded that “Canadian re-
searchers seem to have used the priority programs as an alternative
source of funding, while their Dutch colleagues were able to use these
programs to help their specialties grow above the national average,
and in accordance with selected priorities” [ibid.: 448]. The authors
ascribe these differences to the higher degree of integration of the
Dutch research system and to “organizational slack (e.g. traditional or
lump-sum financing)”, factors that made it possible for Dutch
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researchers to follow policy signals more closely with additional
research, while their Canadian colleagues were forced to use the
additional money for maintaining their existing lines of research
[ibid.].
The inevitable indirect effects of political priorities in research
funding are also still to be explored, in particular studies about
knowledge that is not produced due to the foci created by politics
(see also 3.3). Almost 20 years after Leydesdorff and Gauthier, a study
by Laudel and Weyer [2014] showed that the high integration of the
Dutch science system remains but the system now operates without
slack. Under these conditions, state priorities can create a quasi-
market failure that makes non-priority fields disappear. On the micro-
level, Smith [2010] describes the perception by health inequality
researchers that the pressure to produce “policy relevant research”
limits their autonomy and creativity.
A particularly interesting situation emerges when the state simul-
taneously perceives the necessity to promote a field and to regulate it,
as has been the case for research using human embryonic stem cells.
Taken together, two studies by Furman et al. [2012] and Brunet and
Dubois [2012] provide an opportunity to analyse the impact of state
regulation on the content of a rapidly growing field. Furman et al. use
bibliometrics to study the response of US science to the 2001 decision
by the Bush administration to enable federal funding for research with
existing human embryonic stem cell lines, to prohibit federal funding
for the development of and research on new cell lines, and to place no
restrictions on the use of other than federal funds for research with
human embryonic stem cells. The authors observe a decline in
research with human embryonic stem cells after 2001 until 2003.
The subsequent recovery between 2004 and 2007 is due to research at
elite universities (which had easy access to non-federal funding) and
international collaboration. The results suggest that while the gover-
nance intervention led to a change in research content for researchers
in some universities, these effects were soon compensated for at the
national level by the opportunities for other researchers to circumvent
the governance instrument.
These observations are confirmed by a study of French regulation,
which was based on the bioethics law and thus applied to all research
using human embryonic stem cells. Researchers had to apply for
permission, which was granted if the research was “likely to enable
significant therapeutic advances” and “cannot be pursued using
alternative methods of comparable effectiveness in the present state
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of scientific knowledge” (Art. L.2151-5 of the law, quoted from Brunet
and Dubois: 263). Brunet and Dubois compare French research with
human embryonic stem cells to its counterpart in the UK, and ascribe
both the reduced scale of and the fragmentation of French research to the
regulation. They attribute the reduced scale to the necessity of applying
for permission for research, which made researchers avoid the field. The
fragmentation (many groups not collaborating with each other) was
caused by the demand for proof of therapeutic advances, which oriented
the research towards specific diseases and applied questions rather than
fundamental research. In contrast to their colleagues in the US, French
researchers could not circumvent this regulation.
Although attempts by the state to create and direct research capacities
for the support of public policy goals have increased significantly, the
impact of these attempts on the dynamics of knowledge production has
received comparatively little attention. The state influences research
largely by implementing public policy goals in existing governance
instruments rather than by creating new instruments. The impact of
these policies on the growth of research and its direction appears to be
significant but, again, systematic knowledge regarding the link between
specific governance practices that are applied under specific circum-
stances and have specific effects is missing.
2.3. Evaluations and the rise of performance-based funding
Since the late 1970s, many countries have altered their block
funding of higher education institutions by replacing or supplement-
ing input-based funding for research by performance-based funding.
The logic behind these changes includes incentives (to reward better
performance), redistribution of resources (to increase efficiency), and
improved management (to provide necessary information for change).
Performance is measured either by peer review (which is often
informed by quantitative data) or by quantitative indicators. The
information about research performance is then used as an input for
funding formulae that allocate resources in a zero-sum game (see
Whitley and Gl€aser 2007; Auranen and Nieminen 2010; Hicks 2012
for overviews).2
The effects of performance-based research funding schemes have
attracted a great deal of attention from both stakeholders and researchers.
2 For a recent review of studies of evaluation exercises and performance metrics, see de
Rijcke et al. [2015].
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Political discussions and research were centred on the same questions:
Do the new funding schemes contribute to improving research perfor-
mance? And do they have unintended negative effects? These questions
are of particular interest to our review because they have been addressed
by quantitative and qualitative investigations in higher education re-
search, the sociology of science and science policy studies.
Most studies focus on system-level effects. Studies of the Spanish,
English, Australian, Norwegian and Danish performance-based funding
systems asked whether the introduction of new funding schemes changed
research performance, and with what effects. The analyses applied
a quasi-experimental logic that interpreted the introduction of perfor-
mance-based funding as treatment, and causally ascribed changes occur-
ring after the treatment to these schemes. Research performance was
operationalised in terms of publication behaviour (publications in “good”
journals, however determined) and citation impact of publications.
The major challenge faced by this approach is the control of all
possible confounding variables. This challenge is most clearly illus-
trated by a discussion about the Spanish funding scheme, which
provides increases in salaries for those academics who publish a certain
number of articles in international peer-reviewed journals. Jimenez-
Contreras et al. [2003] claimed that the introduction of this scheme in
1989 caused a disproportionate increase in the number of Spanish
articles in such journals because the increase occurred after the change
in the performance-based salary increase scheme was introduced. The
authors analysed possible confounding variables––investment in R&D,
numbers of researchers––and concluded that the limited growth in
these variables could not explain the increase in publication perfor-
mance. They dismiss several other factors such as international
mobility, international collaboration, and participation in European
funding programmes, as well as the cumulative effect of policies.
The critique of this analysis by Osuna et al. [2011] is based on
a review of five threats to the internal validity of analyses of time series
[ibid.: 580-581]. They found the factors dismissed by Jimenez-
Contreras et al. to be possible causes if time lags between funding
and publication were taken into account, and demonstrated that
a control group of researchers who were not subject to the
performance-based funding scheme showed a similar increase in
research performance. Most importantly, their discussion illus-
trated the problem of confounding variables: there were too many
such variables to consider for a causal ascription of the effects to be
possible.
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The situation is even more complicated when performance-based
funding schemes for universities are studied. The complex causal
chains linking these to national-level changes in research performance
include the strategic responses of universities to the funding schemes,
the resulting changes in the situation of individual researchers, the
strategic responses by researchers to their changed situation, and the
aggregation dynamics of individual changes in research and publica-
tion behaviour. Each of these steps is co-shaped by a host of influences
on the behaviour of individual and collective actors.3 Was the increase
of low-impact publications in Australia caused by a funding formula
that rewards number of publications [Butler 2003], by the preceding
higher education reforms that confronted a large number of academics
with increased expectations to conduct research and publish (a change
described by Meek 1991), or by an increasing competition for project
grants that emphasises track record, i.e. prior publication
(a development described by Gl€aser and Laudel 2007; Gl€aser et al.
2010)? Is it possible to ascribe the increase in “good” Danish
publications to the performance-based funding scheme [Ingwersen
and Larsen 2014]? The authors excluded changes in research funding,
the increase in academic staff, and the internal dynamics of the Web of
Science database as explanations because the growth in productivity
and impact exceeds the other trends. They do not consider the
combined effect of these trends or the increasing concentration of
research funding, either as an effect of competitive grant funding or due
to the new programme for the funding of “Centers of Excellence”,
which was launched in the same year as the performance-based funding
scheme [Langfeldt et al. 2015]. They describe but do not explain the
observation that at least one university does not conform to the pattern.
Aagaard and colleagues conducted the most complex study of this
type to date. They analysed the introduction of the Norwegian
publication indicator [Schneider et al. 2014; Aagaard 2015; Aagaard
et al. 2015]. The authors combined bibliometric studies, surveys, and
interviews in order to assess the impact of this indicator’s introduction
on research. “Research” was operationalised as publication behaviour.
3 This is why questionnaires are useless if
designed as opinion polls, as studies on the
effects of the British Research Assessment
Exercise have amply demonstrated [Gl€aser
et al. 2002]. Surveys that ask respondents
what actually happened in their organisations
in response to policy measures (e.g. Aagaard
2015) appear to be much more fruitful.
Appreciating the difficulties of establishing
causal macro-micro-macro links, Rafols et al.
[2012] wisely published their proposal of
a mechanism by which the use of unsuitable
evaluation indicators ( journal rankings) can
reduce the diversity of research under the
title “How journal rankings can suppress
interdisciplinary research” (emphasis added)
rather than suggesting that it does, for which
there is no evidence.
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In addition, managers and academics at universities were asked to
report changes in their organisation that they ascribe to the indicator.
As in the other studies, causal attribution appears to be difficult.
The authors observe an 82% increase in “publication points” in the
time between the performance measure’s introduction in 2004 and
2012 [Aagaard et al. 2015: 109], and argue that this increase cannot be
fully explained by other factors. In particular, they report that the
number of researchers with a publication in the four main universities
has increased by 116% while the number of R&D personnel has risen
by only 5% [ibid.: 110]. At the same time, they report several
observations that cast doubt on the causal ascription, including:
- the major increase in WoS publications (rather than “publication
points”) occurring prior to the introduction of the indicator
[Schneider et al. 2014: 547];
- substantial increases in R&D funding (37%) and R&D personnel
(21%, Aagaard et al.: 110);
- “strong increases in publication activity among more recently
established universities and among university colleges, many of
which have previously had a much weaker focus on research”
[ibid.]; and
- changes in the publication indicator itself [ibid.].
Aagaard [2015] reports an observation that supports the assump-
tion of a causal impact on publication behaviour, namely the fact that
the indicator is used in decisions about recruitment, promotion, and
salary increases. Unfortunately, no timeline can be attributed to the
introduction of such measures, which makes it impossible to link the
“trickling down” of incentives [ibid.] to the changes in publication
behaviour over time.
Not only are studies on country-level effects limited to changes in
publication practices and citation impact (rather than research prac-
tices), they also appear to be liable to a “post hoc ergo propter hoc”
fallacy, i.e. the conclusion that A must be the cause of B because B
follows A.4 However, attempts to meet the complexity of causation
4 The study by Franzoni et al. [2011]
which attempts to establish a causal link
between incentive systems and submissions
to the journal Science, is particularly prob-
lematic because it operates with very limited
information about these incentive systems.
We can immediately point out two grave
errors in their categorization of national in-
centive systems. The Australian “Research
Quality Framework” was never introduced
(see, e.g. Donovan 2008: 58 or simply the
Wikipedia entry for “Research Quality
Framework”) and thus could not have an
effect on submissions to the journal Science.
The laws on performance-based salaries in
Germany apply only to professors appointed
after the introduction of the laws, and thus
could scarcely have an effect on submissions
to Science in the years up to 2009 (see e.g.
Lange 2007: 163, 169).
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head-on by conducting qualitative studies face interesting problems of
their own. These studies can investigate the actual translation of
changing governance environments for academics into a changing
production of knowledge. However, the observation of effects remains
at the micro-level. In most cases, the causal chain under study ends
with self-reported or self-announced behavioural change [St€ockelova
2012; Linkova 2014; Aagaard 2015]. Lucas [2006] did not ask about
changes in the content of knowledge but focused on strategies of
coping with the British Research Assessment Exercise at different
levels in the university. Attempts to comparatively analyse research-
ers’ field-specific responses to performance-based funding schemes
[Gl€aser and Laudel 2007; Gl€aser et al. 2010; Leisyt _e et al. 2010]
found, not surprisingly, that for researchers in the sciences external
funding was by far a stronger environmental factor than university
funding and accompanying incentives. For example, Australian uni-
versities translated performance-based funding schemes applied to
them in similar schemes applied internally. However, little money
arrived at the researcher level simply because Australian universities
were under-funded [Gl€aser et al. 2010]. Researchers in less resource-
intensive fields are less dependent on grant funding agencies and
university management but may be susceptible to hierarchical pres-
sure (see also Hammarfelt and de Rijcke 2015).
Although they are able to explore researchers’ responses to their
resource and governance environments, micro-level studies share some
limitations. Interview-based studies can explore changes in interview-
ees’ problem choices as described in interviews. The exploration of
research content in interviews is possible and can be triangulated with
individual-level bibliometrics [Gl€aser and Laudel 2007: 134-135;
2015a]. Nevertheless, two challenging questions remain. To what
extent are reported changes in problem choices due to changes in
governance? And do these changes add up to macro-level shifts in
knowledge production? Answering the first question would require
comparative ethnographies, whose resource demands exceed current
funding patterns for social science research. The second question can
be answered if detailed micro-level studies of changing research content
can be linked to field-level changes by advanced bibliometric methods.
Both types of methods have not yet been applied.
Taken together, studies on the impact of performance-based funding
schemes on the content of research express a general dilemma of
research on the impact of governance changes on research content.
Studies on country-level effects, which are important in the research
133
governing science
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975616000047
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universitaetsbibliothek, on 26 Oct 2017 at 10:33:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
context of science policy studies, are forced to limit their measurement
of research practices to indicators of publication behaviour and citation
impact of publications, and must black-box the complex causal web that
mediates the relationship between knowledge production, publication
of new findings and their reception. Micro-level studies of changes in
research practices and their causes can draw a more complex picture
but are still largely unable to link their findings back to the aggregate
dynamics at the levels of countries or scientific communities.
2.4. Higher education reforms and the rise of “new public management”
Over the past three decades, many oecd countries have introduced
substantial reforms to the governance of universities [Paradeise et al.
2009]. So far, these changes have predominantly been studied by
higher education researchers. They usually involved (and involve) the
development of new relationships with the state and other extra-mural
agencies as well as shifts in the internal management of academic
institutions, which are often summarised under the generic title of
“New Public Management” or npm [Schimank 2005; De Boer et al.
2007; Ferlie et al. 2009]. Against a common background of a growing
discrepancy between performance expectation and public funding of
academic research and teaching, states have increasingly sought to
reconstruct universities as quasi-independent collective agents on
which they can rely to realise national education and research goals.
These changes result in major reconstructions of authority rela-
tions in higher education. The increase in university autonomy from
the state appears to be very limited at best in spite of the npm rhetoric
that aims at shifting responsibilities from the state to universities
[Westerheijden et al. 2009; Capano 2011]. At the same time, the
internal redistribution of authority from academics and their collegial
decision fora to a managerial hierarchy of university senior manage-
ment, deans, and heads of departments has progressed in many
countries [Schimank 2005; Paradeise et al. 2009; Musselin 2013;
2014]. Evaluations of research performance have become one of the
most important tools for state governance of universities and univer-
sity management [Whitley and Gl€aser 2007].
Although changes in university management significantly alter
authority relations in universities, surprisingly little research has been
conducted on the impact of these changes on research content.
A theoretical argument by Whitley and Gl€aser [2014] points to principal
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limitations of universities’ abilities to “manage” research and thus to
limitations of higher education reforms. However, there is little
empirical research to support or refute this argument. Higher education
research has described academics’ resistance to npm [Bauer and Henkel
1998; Anderson 2008; Moscati 2008] and the impact of npm on academic
identities [Henkel 2000; 2005] but has done little to explore how npm
affects the conduct and content of research. Studies investigating the
impact of npm on research content at all focus on just one governance
instrument––performance-based funding––and treat changed authority
relations as a context of this relationship (see 2.3, and e.g. Morris 2002).
Three exceptions should be mentioned. In their analysis of an
evaluation exercise as a tool for profile-building at German universities,
Meier and Schimank [2010] ascribe the possibility of profile building to
changed authority relations, to which the evaluations themselves
contributed. The extent to which profile building changes research
content could not be assessed at the time of the investigation. Laudel
and Weyer [2014] link changed authority relations at universities and
the tight integration of the Dutch science system to the possible
disappearance of research specialties, to which profile-building activi-
ties of universities also contribute. Louvel’s [2010] analysis of shifting
authority relations in French laboratories describes significant changes
in the conduct of research but does not address research content.
The few studies of consequences of npm for research content again
demonstrate the difficulty of causally ascribing changes in scientific
knowledge to a particular governance process. The impact of npm on
research content can only be assessed in the context of all other
influences. So far, it seems to be rather weak in most countries because
the opportunities by management to interfere with the recruitment of
academics or to make them redundant are limited. In addition,
opportunities for management to direct researchers’ choices of prob-
lems and approaches is limited due to the specific nature of scientific
work [Musselin 2007; Whitley 2008; Whitley and Gl€aser 2014]. This
is why “governance by funding” is likely to remain a stronger
influence than hierarchical steering.
2.5. Academy-industry relationships and the rise of privatised knowledge
At least four interrelated processes have contributed to changes in
relationships between publicly funded research and industry. First,
the state has significantly increased its demand for contributions by
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science to technological progress and economic growth, particularly
through innovation [Behrens and Gray 2001: 179-180; Coriat and
Orsi 2002: 1493-1495; Kearnes and Wienroth 2011; Berman 2012;
2014]. Second, the growth of scientific knowledge has increased the
number of epistemic links between science and industry and thus of
science-based industries [Mahdi and Pavitt 1997; Koumpis and
Pavitt 1999]. This increases industry’s demand for public research
support as well as opportunities for academic researchers to access
relevant information, equipment and materials [Meyer-Krahmer
and Schmoch 1998; D’Este and Perkmann 2011]. Third, the
increased science base of many industries and its extension towards
fundamental scientific research have increased opportunities for
making profits by investing in research and either selling its results
or betting on capital gains [Pavitt 2001; Coriat and Orsi 2002: 1500-
1501]. Finally, the growing scarcity of public research funding has
increased the willingness of researchers to seek funding from
industry [Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch 1998; Jankowski 1999;
Laudel 2006; Lam 2010; D’Este and Perkmann 2011].
These trends made the volume and variety of links between
university research and commercial interests grow and increased the
latter’s influence on research content. We exclude from our consider-
ation the major concern of science and innovation policy studies,
namely the question whether increased academy-industry links con-
tribute to innovation and economic success. Instead, we focus on
consequences for the production of scientific knowledge by these
researchers and their scientific communities that result from new
incentives for researchers to engage in commercialization activities
and the support by the state of forms that improve the opportunities for
commercial actors to influence the content of publicly funded research.5
The impact of industry interests on the content of research can be
considered at different levels and for different forms of academy-
industry links. Levels include the content that is directly linked to
industry interests––the content of collaborative or sponsored projects,
more general research agendas of researchers having relationships with
5 A related but different topic concerns
behavioral differences between researchers in
universities and industry (see Kleinman and
Vallas 2001 for a general argument about
converging conditions for research in acade-
mia and industry). The question of whether,
why, and how researchers in industry share
information, and how their information shar-
ing behavior differs from the behavior of
their colleagues in industry, has been
a long-standing issue in science and innova-
tion policy research [Von Hippel 1987;
Kreiner and Schultz 1993; Haeussler 2011].
Unfortunately, industrial research has not yet
been subjected to the same scrutiny as pub-
licly funded research (see Penders et al. 2009
for an interesting account of the reasons for
this asymmetry).
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industry, and the knowledge production of scientific communities
whose members engage in commercialization of research. At each of
these levels, the different forms of academy-industry relations can
exercise specific influence on research (Table 1). Investigations of the
impact of university-industry links on the conduct and content of
research included these forms in various combinations. A frequently
used independent variable is “receiving support from industry”
[Blumenthal et al. 1996; Behrens and Gray 2001; Evans 2010a; 2010b].
Murray and Stern [2007] and Campbell et al. [2000]. investigated the
impact of patenting research findings. Evans [2010a; 2010b]. also
included collaboration with industry as indicated by co-authorships.
Changes in the content of individual projects linked to industry have
received little attention so far, probably for the reasons that explain the
general avoidance of corporate research [Penders et al. 2009]. The only
aspect of research content that has been explored is performance (see
e.g. the review by Baldini 2008: 295-302). The studies reported by
Baldini ask how research performance (measured by publications and
citations) is associated with innovation performance (measured by
patents or start-ups), albeit without establishing causality.
There is evidence concerning impacts of industry links on
graduate student projects but, again, the evidence is mixed [Baldini
2008]. Some studies found no negative effects (e.g. Behrens and
Gray 2001), while other studies reported by Baldini [2008: 302-304]
point to enforced secrecy and reduced learning experiences. The
only exception is research on the manipulation of outcomes in the
sponsor’s favour. The suspicion that research projects funded by
commercial enterprises are biased has initiated discussions and
meta-studies in biomedical research. In his reviews of these studies,
Krimsky [2013] concludes that “[i]ndustry-sponsored trials are more
likely than trials sponsored by non-profit organisations, including
government agencies, to yield results that are consistent with the
sponsor’s commercial interest” [Krimsky 2013: 582]. He also finds
a small number of pharmaco-economic studies to show such an effect
[ibid.]. Investigations of industry-sponsored research on specific
commodities such as tobacco unambiguously demonstrate that this
research is biased towards funders’ interests. Krimsky also points out
that a variety of reasons may cause “funding effects”, and argues for
ethnographies to determine the actual mechanisms at work between
funding and bias. A study by Sismondo [2009] points to one of these
mechanisms. Commercial services have emerged that design, sched-
ule, and launch publications about drugs as part of pharmaceutical
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6 Studies of biological research by Morris
[2000] and of government-sponsored re-
search in public health by Smith [2014]
suggest that window dressing and
negotiations with the funder of research often
lead to a compromise between the interests of
funder and researcher.
T a b l e 1
Findings on the impact of four forms of university-industry links on the
contents of research on three levels of aggregation levels of research
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companies’ marketing strategies. Researchers from universities are
asked to author or co-author such publications. Nothing is known yet
about the impact of such “ghost-written” publications on a commun-
ity’s knowledge production.
Beyond the immediate impact on the content of collaborative or
sponsored research, the more general and potentially more sustainable
impact of academy-industry links on academic researchers’ research
agendas is of particular interest. Qualitative and quantitative studies
have found sponsored research to influence research agendas by moving
them towards more applied research or towards research with more
potential for collaboration [Blumenthal et al. 1996; Lam 2010]. The
reverse also occurs: some researchers tend to “shy away” from problems
associated with commercialising results [Owen-Smith and Powell
2001]. Furthermore, the influence on research agendas works both
ways: Cohen et al. [2002] showed publicly funded research to have
a large impact not only on project completion but also on the research
agendas of industrial R&D across much of the manufacturing sector.
Academy-industry relationships do not only influence the agendas
of researchers who have links to industry or commercialise their
research findings themselves. Several studies have found that research
agendas are influenced by the perception that too much knowledge of
a field is controlled by intellectual property rights. Some researchers
tend to avoid such fields [Eisenberg 2001: 225, 233; Walsh et al. 2007;
Murray et al. 2009; Evans 2010a: 761]. The consequences of this
intellectual migration away from intellectual property rights towards
the directions in which fields evolve have yet to be investigated.
Research on academic spin-offs has found little change in univer-
sity research agendas due to double affiliation of academics or
collaboration with spin-offs. In their analysis of French spin-offs
from cnrs laboratories, Shinn and Lamy [2006] distinguished three
types of scientist-entrepreneurs but did not associate impact on
university research agendas with any type. Zomer et al. [2010: 347]
did not find Dutch research-based spin-off companies to alter the
research agendas of university-based researchers directly but did not
exclude the possibility of a “soft impact” through the academics’
changed awareness of practical problems.7 In contrast, Cooper [2009]
7 The same appears to apply to techno-
logical platforms. Merz and Biniok [2010]
analysed technological platforms in micro-
and nanotechnology in Switzerland. They
found the platforms to “provide new means
to increase contact and interrelation between
academic science and industry” [ibid.: 120]
but observed little research collaboration
emerging from these contacts. Joint use of
these platforms by academic science and in-
dustry does not seem to affect the former’s
research agenda.
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found that the potential to create for-profit start-ups from research
findings did influence problem choices. Unfortunately, he did not
provide specific information about consequences for research content.
The impact of academy-industry relationships on the community
level of knowledge production has been ascribed to aggregated
changes in the conduct rather than content of research at the in-
dividual level. Concerning conduct, Blumenthal et al. [1996] found
industry support to be associated with increased secrecy and delayed
publication. Campbell et al. [2000] found that commercial activities
were associated with data withholding.
The most complex study so far on relationships between industry
collaboration, sharing and the diffusion of knowledge in scientific
communities was conducted by Evans [2010a; 2010b]. Combining
qualitative and quantitative methods in an investigation of the
Arabidopsis community, he observed that industry collaboration
(both at organisational and individual levels) decreases the likelihood
of materials sharing but increases the sharing of pre-publication
manuscripts. Evans also found industry collaboration to slow or
reduce the diffusion of knowledge but not to limit its thematic
breadth (which he measured by calculating the annual proportion of
citing articles that did not share coded scientific terms with the focal
article). These results expand prior observations by Murray and
Stern [2007], who found declining citation rates of research findings
after patenting and thus a reduced diffusion of results. Evans’s
findings are indirectly confirmed by a study of research using
genetically engineered mice. This use was first aggressively con-
trolled by patent holders [Murray et al. 2009]. Murray et al. found
a significant increase in the level and diversity of follow-on research
after limitations on the use of these mice were reduced by nih
agreements with patent holders. Further confirmation can be derived
from observations of researchers’ “avoidance” of topics they associ-
ate with restrictions due to intellectual property rights [Eisenberg
2001: 225, 233; Owen-Smith and Powell 2001; Walsh et al. 2007;
Evans 2010a: 761].8 Other scientists ignore or actively resist re-
strictions created by intellectual property rights [Murray 2010].
8 According to Owen-Smith and Powell
[2001: 106-107], some researchers respond to
the threat of use restrictions by utilizing
patents as protection. They patent their
results in order to protect their freedom of
use (see also Packer and Webster 1996: 444;
Rappert and Webster 1997: 122). This utili-
zation of patents resembles the use of “copy-
left” in the communal production of open
source software as described e.g. by Lerner
and Tirole [2000].
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Taken together, the studies investigating the impacts of academy-
industry links on the content of research have established that such an
impact exists, and that it varies between fields, but usually end there.
This limitation is caused by two methodological problems. The first
problem is the studies’ self-restriction to academy-industry links.
Similar to the studies of performance-based funding schemes, studies
of academy-industry links do not take into account other influences on
project content or research agendas. They observe that, in most cases,
collaboration with or funding from industry constitutes only a pro-
portion of a researcher’s agenda but do not investigate how this
proportion interacts with other influences. They also observe varia-
tions between fields but do not investigate the properties of fields that
are responsible for the variation, let alone the ways in which these
properties affect the building of research agendas in conjunction with
academy-industry links. Since variations in the sharing of information
about research are linked to the epistemic practices of fields.9 These
field-specific practices of information sharing constitute the back-
ground against which influences of academic-industry relationships
on information and materials sharing must be assessed.
The second, connected, problem is the choice of empirical
methods for investigating the impact on research content. Inves-
tigations are dominated by surveys and bibliometric studies, both of
which are limited when it comes to exploring research content. The
very few interview-based studies restrict themselves to asking
about attitudes and behavioural change without exploring the
consequences for research content. Ethnographies and in-depth
explorations of research content in interviews are missing in the
toolbox of studies investigating academy-industry links, which is
why findings about research content are limited to the basic-applied
dimension and to inconsistent findings about research quality.
The most promising results have been contributed by studies of
knowledge diffusion. The creative bibliometric approaches by Evans
[2010a; 2010b] and Murray and colleagues [Murray and Stern 2007;
Murray et al. 2009] enable the observation of diffusion processes at
the level of scientific communities. This level is crucial for many
9 For example, Velden (2013) found re-
searchers in synthetic chemistry having ex-
periences of being scooped and therefore
deciding strategically on information sharing,
while experimental physicists she observed
were much more open and experienced less
scooping. She attributed the difference to
synthetic chemistry’ individualised research
practices, reliance on individual skills and
short duration of research processes, which
she contrasted with experimental physics’
collaborative, long-term research processes
based on the construction of dedicated
equipment.
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questions about research content but rarely addressed due to meth-
odological problems. Extending the methodological ideas of diffusion
studies to other problems of changing research content at the
community level is certainly worthwhile.
2.6. Emerging trends in the governance of science
In addition to the main trends discussed in the previous sections we
would like to highlight two emerging trends in the governance of
science that have found the attention of science studies, namely the
increasing activity of civil society actors in the governance of research
and “governance by knowledge.” The dynamics of these trends is
difficult to assess as yet. Both are linked to the emergence of new
interests concerning contributions by science to solutions of societal
problems or problems expected from science or science-based inter-
ventions. We limit our following discussion to those studies that
include changes in research content, thereby excluding a large body of
literature on public engagement with science and participatory
science.
An increasing number of empirical studies has been devoted to
attempts by new actors to influence the production of scientific knowledge.
By “new actors” we mean collective actors that represent specific interests
concerning science, which they believe to be insufficiently included in
traditional governance arrangements. Examples include patient organisa-
tions, foundations concerned with public health or cures for diseases, and
environmental movements.10 We will consider them as social movements,
although the interests are often represented by organisations that are not
co-extensive with the movements themselves. These movements often
identify knowledge that has not been produced (see also 3.3).
The new actors mainly use existing instruments in their attempts
to shape research content. They lobby for a change of state priorities,
mobilize resources for dedicated research organisations or contract
research, or influence the agenda setting of research councils [Epstein
1996; Moore 2005: 305-308; Morello-Frosch et al. 2005: 263-265;
Brown et al. 2006; Frickel et al. 2010]. Thus, their success––the actual
change of research content they achieve––depends on the conditions
already discussed in the previous sections, in particular the strong
10 This type of actor is of course not
completely new. The involvement of social
movements in the governance of science has
been traced back to at least the late 1960s.
However, the number and range of such
movements appear to have risen significantly
in the last three decades (see e.g. Moore 2005:
301-304 for the US).
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positions of researchers in the ultimate problem choices. For example,
Pittens et al. [2014] showed that although the involvement of patient
groups in the setting of research agendas and the latter’s translation
into research programmes had a strong influence on these pro-
grammes, patient groups’ priorities disappeared in the subsequent
implementation of research programmes due to their exclusion from
that phase.
Social movements also use less common channels such as directly
influencing scientists, e.g. by building and maintaining networks of
scientists working on topics they are interested in, or by befriending
scientists [Panofsky 2011]. Of these alternative means of influencing
research content, we would like to briefly discuss influencing research
content by providing knowledge. We consider this mode of influenc-
ing research content as particularly interesting because it utilises the
way in which scientific communities intentionally and unintentionally
shape the research of their members. Researchers select problems and
approaches based on the state of the art, i.e. by taking in and
evaluating the knowledge produced by their communities. Providing
additional data may change the input to these selection processes and
thus the content of knowledge produced by researchers. Although the
contribution of data for research by non-scientists has a long tradition
in a variety of fields (see e.g. Moore 2005), this rarely occurs with the
aim of influencing the content of research. The shaping of research
agendas through additional research information was observed in the
case of patients and patient organisations [Brown et al. 2006: 525;
Panofsky 2011: 38; Polich 2011; Pols 2013; Rabeharisoa et al. 2014].
While these studies confirm the effectiveness of this “governance by
knowledge”, the actual change of research content brought about has
not yet been sufficiently studied.
The same applies to similar attempts of industrial enterprises
to “govern by knowledge.” Sismondo’s [2009] account of “ghost
writing”––the preparation of research articles about the efficacy
of drugs as part of marketing strategies––demonstrates that firms
deliberately introduce knowledge in the scientific discourse. Al-
though medical practitioners may well be their major target group,
these articles are likely to have an impact on medical research
as well. Unfortunately, this impact has not yet been studied.
Firms also do the opposite by excluding knowledge from use.
Again, the impact of this strategy on research agendas remains
under-studied.
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2.7. Strengths and weaknesses of effect-searching studies
The empirical studies discussed in the preceding five sections apply
five distinct strategies to approach research content. A first strategy
involves measuring macro-level effects such as speed or directions of
knowledge diffusion. This strategy exploits citation links between
publications, and links citation dynamics to other properties of
publications or their authors. A second, frequently applied, strategy
uses publication and citation indicators for measuring one particular
aspect of research content, namely performance as expressed in
volume or quality of research. This strategy, which attempts to draw
conclusions about macro-level variables (the performance of the
science system) from aggregate effects, seems particularly vulnerable
in the light of the many problems associated with publication-based
and citation-based indicators. Evaluative bibliometrics has been
conducting an intensive discussion of these indicators’ validity and
statistical reliability, field-specific behaviour, and necessary normal-
isation. Methodological advances that were necessary in the context of
bibliometric evaluations do not always seem to be matched by the
application of indicators in research projects on the governance of
science.
A third strategy of measuring research content utilises publication
indicators as proxies of publication practices. This approach has the
advantage of matching the conclusions that are drawn to what is actually
measured by the indicator. At the same time, it operates a step away from
research content. Publication practices can be assumed to be linked to
research practices and research content. However, the nature of this link
is unknown, and is likely to vary across fields of research, career stage,
and situations of researchers. Consequently, no conclusions about re-
search content can be drawn from analyses of publication behaviour.
A similar argument must be applied to the fourth strategy, which
attempts to measure research practices by surveys. Respondents are
asked how their research practices (especially their choices of research
problems) have changed.11 This strategy suffers from a similar
problem to that of exploring publication practices. Although practices
of problem choice are more tightly coupled with research content than
publication practices, the link between a general description of
11 Unfortunately, some surveys ask re-
spondents directly how their practices have
changed in response to a specific governance
instrument. This passes the study’s question
on to respondents and collects only respond-
ents’ subjective theories about the impact of
a governance instrument.
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changing problem choice given by respondents to surveys, and
changes in the content of knowledge produced by them, is far from
clear. This is why statements like “research practices of these scholars
were investigated using both publication statistics and responses to
questionnaires” [Hammarfelt and de Rijcke 2015: 64] simply do not
ring true––whatever data were collected by these methods are unlikely
to represent actual research practices.
Finally, a fifth strategy––using semi-structured interviews and
ethnographies––enables conclusions to be drawn about research
content because it can be used to explore with scientists their
production of scientific knowledge in great detail.12 This last strategy
complements analyses of knowledge diffusion at the macro-level by
exploring the reception and use of knowledge in the production of new
knowledge and establishing the complex influences shaping knowl-
edge production, which in turn can be traced back to governance.
However, these studies leave us with micro-level effects which, albeit
established with some validity, cannot yet be linked to the macro-level
dynamics of knowledge. We still lack a “research content description
language” in which (changes in) knowledge content can be described
in a generalised way. Our vocabulary––“mainstream”, “low-risk”,
“applied”, “interdisciplinary”––is too coarse to appropriately grasp
effects like the disappearance or emergence of topics, methods, or
kinds of data in particular research communities.
We are left with a dilemma, then. With few exceptions, studies of
macro-level changes cannot convincingly establish causality due to the
impossibility of measuring research content, the reduction of com-
plexity enforced by quantitative methods, and the necessity of black-
boxing processes of causation. Studies of micro-level responses, on the
other hand, can address research content and establish causality in
micro-situations without being able (yet) to link these changes to
aggregation processes and macro-level dynamics.
3. How is research content shaped?
In this section, we discuss studies that start from the construction
of scientific knowledge and ask how these construction processes are
shaped. Most contributions to this question stem from the core of the
12 In order to realise this potential,
interview-based studies must of course avoid
the trap of simply passing on the research
question to informants (see above, note 10).
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sociology of science, the sociology of scientific knowledge or studies of
science, technology and society (sts)––we again skip terminological
developments for the sake of content. These studies unwittingly
contributed two fundamental observations to our knowledge about
the shaping of research content by governance. First, laboratory
studies again and again observed the high degree of autonomy
researchers have in their choices of research problems and methods.
This does not mean that these choices are made without any outside
influence––the material environment, colleagues and collaborators, the
literature, career considerations and many other factors influence the
decisions made by researchers. However, all these influences are
processed by researchers, who shape what they consider as “do-able
problems” [Fujimura 1987] accordingly. All researchers are thus
“obligatory points of passage” for influences on their research content.
Second, these studies demonstrated that researchers’ opportunities
to change the directions of their research are limited in most cases.
Researchers formulate research problems and personal research pro-
grammes using their current scientific knowledge and considering
their experimental systems [Knorr-Cetina 1981, 1995a; Pinch 1986;
Latour and Woolgar 1986 [1979]; Rheinberger 1994, 1996]. Their
research proposals and publications are assessed in the light of their
prior work (e.g. Myers 1990; Laudel 2006). Although this orienting
influence of material and intellectual resources accumulated in prior
research does not make radical change impossible, it makes it more
difficult and thus more unlikely.
These two observations explain why researchers often deviate from
expectations communicated by the governance of research. Even
researchers who are willing and able to follow these signals still need
to translate them into their research contexts. This translation is
shaped by the knowledge and expectations of the researchers’ scien-
tific communities, opportunities provided by their local work envi-
ronment, and access to collaboration. Researchers must balance all
these factors in order to construct a “doable” problem [Fujimura
1987] whose solution is relevant to the particular scientific community
targeted by scientists. It is not surprising that many of these problems
do not fully coincide with the intentions communicated by
governance.
The ways in which individual researchers and research groups
process conditions of research shaped by governance are thus central
to understanding causal influences on research content. This process-
ing is an inseparable part of the construction of scientific knowledge
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and thus belongs to the domain of constructivist science studies. We
first discuss the few exceptions, i.e. studies investigating the impact of
complex conditions on research from an organisational or governance
perspective (3.1). The second section reviews contributions to our
problem by constructivist science studies (3.2). We then introduce an
important contribution by the sociology of science to our topic,
namely the recent interest of science studies in the absence of
knowledge, which in some instances can be traced back to the impact
of governance (3.3). As a conclusion to this section, we outline missed
opportunities and necessary contributions of knowledge-focused
studies (3.4).
3.1. Conditions for excellent research
The then famous internationally comparative study by Pelz and
Andrews [1966] was probably the first to ask how organisations shape
the conduct of research. Studies with a focus on organisational environ-
ments were conducted until the 1970s but were then marginalised by the
constructivist turn. They were put back on the agenda by Law [1994]
and Vaughan [1999], neither of whom established a clear link between
organisational phenomena and the content of research. In particular,
although Vaughan convincingly demonstrates the fact that organisations
“can complicate and manipulate the entire knowledge-production pro-
cess” [Vaughan 1999:931], her investigation of a single case of techno-
logical development cannot establish necessary or sufficient conditions
for specific influences of an organisation on knowledge production, or
explain how this impact would vary between technologies. The impact of
organisations on the content of research is likely to vary with organisa-
tional structures and field-specific epistemic practices. These causal links
still need to be established.
More recently, researchers have attempted to identify favourable
conditions for “breakthrough” or exceptionally creative research.
Hollingsworth and Hollingsworth [Hollingsworth 2008; Hollingsworth
and Hollingsworth 2011] identified exceptional research in the life
sciences and looked for common conditions under which this research
took place. They concluded that “major discoveries tended to occur
more frequently in organisational contexts that were relatively small
and had high degrees of autonomy, flexibility, and the capacity to adapt
rapidly to the fast pace of change in the global environment of science”
[Hollingsworth 2008: 321]. Intraorganisational conditions include
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moderately high scientific diversity (across the organisation and
internalised in the scientists it recruits) as well as high intensities
of communication and social integration [Hollingsworth and
Hollingsworth 2011: 17-40]. With a similar objective, Heinze et al.
used a survey in which experts from human genetics and nanoscience/
nanotechnology nominated more than 400 highly creative research
accomplishments [Heinze et al. 2007] and conducted 20 case studies of
research groups in which such accomplishments occurred [Heinze et al.
2009]. They found “that creative accomplishments are associated with
small group size, organisational contexts with sufficient access to
a complementary variety of technical skills, stable research sponsorship,
timely access to extra-mural skills and resources, and facilitating
leadership” [Heinze et al. 2009: 610].
The findings of both studies are very general, mainly because the
researchers looked for commonalities of all their cases in order to
identify the most important conditions. The downside of this analyt-
ical strategy is that it does not significantly contribute to explanations
because it cannot reveal what mechanisms produce specific outcomes
under specific circumstances. This kind of explanation requires
comparative case studies that systematically vary important conditions
and outcomes, as has been attempted by Laudel and Gl€aser [2014].
The same idea shaped an internationally comparative study of the
impact of changing authority relations on conditions for scientific
innovations. The project started from the observation that the overall
changes in the governance of research (see section 2. above) have
altered authority relations concerning research content, and asked
how these changes have modified the conditions for scientific inno-
vations. The comparison of the development of innovations in physics
[Bose-Einstein condensation, Laudel et al. 2014b], biology [evolu-
tionary developmental biology, Laudel et al. 2014a], education re-
search (international large-scale student assessments, Gl€aser et al.
2014) and linguistics (computerised corpus linguistics, Engwall et al.
2014) in four countries demonstrated the varied impact of changing
authority relations [Whitley 2014]. In particular, it turned out that,
while changes in authority relations might have led to more flexibility
at the level of national science systems, many rigidities remained in
place and new ones (such as the short-termism of funding) have
emerged. The opportunities to develop innovation depends on the
former’s epistemic characteristics, which translate into the innovation-
specific necessary features of careers, resource allocation schemes, and
evaluation practices [Whitley 2014].
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3.2. The analysis of governance in constructivist studies of scientific research
The foundational constructivist studies saw practices of governance
affecting the production of scientific knowledge but did not consider
them because they did not seem to make a difference for the questions
ethnographic observers wanted to answer at that time. Knorr-Cetina
[1981: 68-93; 1982] observed the impact of governance—the constant
need for scientist to adjust their research agenda to interests of other
actors such as funding agencies—and concluded that instead of
scientific communities, “transepistemic arenas” constitute the relevant
context for researchers. Latour and Woolgar [1986 [1979]: 187-233]
derived from their ethnography the model of a “cycle of credibility”
that links the production of knowledge claims to the conditions under
which the resources for this production are obtained. Fujimura’ [1987]
showed that researchers construct “do-able” research problems, and
that the “do-ability” of research problems does not only depend on
epistemic factors but on conditions constructed by governance as well.
In spite of these observations, there are no systematic accounts of
how (by what means and with what effects) the governance arrange-
ments in which researchers are embedded, and to which they adapt,
modify the content of the knowledge produced by those researchers.
The sociology of scientific knowledge was (and still is) interested in
different questions. The questions asked address a deeper level of
researchers’ engagement with material objects, knowledge, or with
each other. Governance, and its function of maintaining research
processes, constitutes a background that is implicitly disregarded.
There are degrees of disregard, however, which create a spectrum.
We describe this spectrum of considering governance with exam-
ples from more recent studies of research content. At one end, we find
studies that look so deeply into the construction of scientific knowl-
edge that they do not even see governance. For example, Hoeppe
[2014] conducts an ethnomethodological study to answer the question
“How, then, do researchers achieve agreement on what constitutes
a successful combination of data?” [ibid: 245]. He describes the
institutional context and the governance of data production and
sharing [ibid: 245-246] and proceeds to studying practices of “working
data together”. Organisational conditions and governance completely
disappear, and the practical problems faced by researchers are the only
focus.
A next step from this pole towards increasing consideration of
governance is the ethnography by Owen-Smith [2001], who studies
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the management of laboratory work and explores in detail the
connection between social differentiation and practices of scientific
discussions in the lab. Although the social differentiation is greatly
influenced by funding (some researchers have their own funding,
others depend on the director’s grants), the conditions for acquiring
these grants and their impact on the directions of research in the
laboratory are not discussed. Conditions shaped by governance are
present as a background throughout the study but are not treated as
relevant to the question asked.
Hackett [2005] also discusses the functioning of research groups.
He describes the role of a research group’s “identity”, the way control
is exercised in the lab, approaches to risk, competition, and funding.
The outside world plays a far more important role in his account than
in Owen-Smith’s because he considers the embeddedness of research
groups in the competitive world of bioscience as an important
condition. However, the conditions shaped by governance (competi-
tion, conditions under which grants are awarded, careers) are not
considered with regard to their influence on research content. They
form a background that obviously shapes behaviour but whose impact
on research content remains obscure.
Kleinman [1998] explicitly argued that laboratory studies had
neglected the embeddedness of laboratories in larger structures, and
set out to explore the impact of such structures:
I entered the laboratory knowing that this lab had relations with university
administration, with for-profit companies with which the laboratory collabo-
rates, and with commercial suppliers of research materials. I knew, furthermore,
that matters of intellectual property were of concern to the lab leader and lab
members. I did not know what these factors meant for lab practices or how they
affected laboratory life. Finding this out was the aim of my project [Kleinman
1998: 291].
Kleinman showed that agrichemical companies defined the research
agenda of the laboratory, and the processes through which this
occurred. The laboratory worked in an applied agrichemical field,
and the disease control agent it worked on was compared to commercial
fungicides with regard to their cost-benefit ratio. He also described how
the lab’s dependence on a commercially produced research material,
Taq polymerase, created problems for research, and how difficult it
would have been to circumvent buying the polymerase due to patent
protection. Turning to the university administration and its role in
patenting and licencing issues, he finally demonstrated the potential of
this embeddedness of the lab to hinder research collaborations.
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In his laboratory study, Kleinman identified three “pathways of
impact” that make governance issues “reach through” to research
content. He was not able to establish the extent to which they actually
change research content because his ethnography was limited to
showing that the research he observed proceeded as it did under the
specific conditions created by governance. He could not consider the
impact of alternative governance arrangements.
These laboratory studies mark a spectrum of the rising awareness
of, and interest in, issues of governance. The collection of laboratory
studies we perused is unevenly distributed across this spectrum. Most
of the studies were at the “Hoeppe pole” of the spectrum, while only
few were at the “Kleinman pole” (Tousignant 2013 on the cessation of
research due to a lack of resources in a Senegalese lab coming closest).
We hasten to add that we do not judge the value of any of these
studies. Our spectrum expresses the degree to which different kinds of
research questions asked by laboratory studies are positioned to yield
findings on the ways in which governance includes research content.
We do not imply any normative statement about “right” and “wrong”
or “important” and “unimportant” research questions.
3.3. Undone science
Another stream of research relevant to our question about the
impact of governance on research content concerns knowledge that
has not been produced. As the small but very rapidly growing body of
literature on this topic indicates, this question is as complex as its
dominant counterpart––the production of knowledge––and fraught
with additional ontological, conceptual and methodological problems
[Frickel 2014a; 2014b]. The topic is also inseparable from the impact
of governance on research content because the notion of governance
having an impact implies that different governance would produce
different knowledge. Any governance that contributes to the existence
of specific knowledge also contributes to the non-existence of other
knowledge. This is why studies addressing our question explicitly or
implicitly struggle with the problem of counterfactuals. What would
have happened if the governance were different?
There are many forms of absent knowledge and many factors
contributing to absences [Gross 2007]. Theoretical and methodolog-
ical traditions, the presence and absence of opportunities to produce
specific knowledge and interests in the presence of some or the
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absence of other specific knowledge can all contribute to “undone
science” [Frickel et al. 2010]. In the context of our research question,
we are interested in science that is undone because of governance. In
these cases, the lack of specific knowledge is often pointed out by
interested parties (Hess 2007: 22, see also 2.6). These cases are very
useful for the study of undone science because specific absences of
knowledge are not easily identified beyond the trivial case of
researchers framing their contributions by describing gaps in their
community’s knowledge. Furthermore, we can limit our discussion to
cases in which the absence of scientific knowledge is due to specific
research practices that are shaped or maintained by governance.
Of the four case studies presented by Frickel et al. [2010], the “chlorine
sunset controversy” is of particular interest to our question. The contro-
versy addressed a regulatory paradigm that influenced the construction and
articulation of research priorities. The regulatory paradigm required that
each chlorinated chemical be individually tested for harmfulness. Oppo-
nents pointed out that the entire class of chlorinated chemicals was likely to
be dangerous and demanded research that systematically addressed this
problem. They lost, not least because the chemical industry had a strong
interest in maintaining the traditional paradigm.
These observations resonate with Kleinman and Suryanarayanan’s
[2013] study of the “Colony Collapse Disorder”––a honey bee colony’s
sudden loss in its adult population. The authors demonstrate that the
dominant “toxicological epistemic form” underlying the regulatory para-
digm for insecticides exclusively focused on lethal doses of individual
insecticides for individual honey bees and thus “ignored-meaning that it
failed to study, indeed could not study or would not consider seriously-
possible evidence of the effects of low or ‘sublethal’ levels of insecticides”
[ibid: 497-498]. Information provided by commercial beekeepers requires
a different epistemic form for approaching the problem but is largely
ignored. As in the case of chlorinated chemicals, a dominant epistemic
form that is incapable of producing specific knowledge is maintained by
governance arrangements for regulating a specific industry.
These two examples illustrate both the potential and the current
limitations of studies of undone science. Such studies provide the
epistemological opportunity to enhance our understanding of the ways
in which governance shapes research content by investigating what
happens in the “shadow” of governance (which does not imply that all
this is necessarily unintentional). However, realising this potential
requires overcoming the exclusive focus on consequences of undone
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science outside science and including the impact of undone science on
the knowledge production of scientific communities.
3.4. Strength and weaknesses of influence-searching studies
This brief review of some recent research on the construction of
scientific knowledge indicates a great but largely unused potential.
The ways in which conditions of research are translated into
changed knowledge have been studied in great detail by many
scholars. Many of these studies also include a comparative assess-
ment of influences in complex situations. They explore the content
of knowledge production, often benefitting from a long and deep
immersion in the field under study. sts has the research tradition
and expertise that makes it possible to trace the impact of
governance to its ends––the content of knowledge being produced
by the governed research.13
From the point of view of our research question, it is a pity that sts
has other interests than exploring the causal link between governance
and research content. One possible reason for this reluctance may be
the fear of a loss of “empirical resolution”: “If we choose a unit of
analysis larger than the actual site of action, we remain removed from
the indeterminacy which marks the situation” [Knorr-Cetina 1981:
43]. Another reason is likely to be the dominant descriptive orienta-
tion of the sts mainstream [Frickel 2014a: 89], which is at odds with
the inherently causal interest underlying this review, an interest we
appear to share with the new political sociology of science [ibid.;
Frickel and Moore 2005b: 8-9].
Addressing causality in the impact of governance on research
content would also raise two additional questions. First, such research
would need to be comparative because assessing variations of gover-
nance and changes in knowledge content is necessary for causal
ascription. It is very likely that governance has not surfaced more
strongly in most ethnographies because they are single-case studies.
13 The potential of ethnographic studies
for the exploration of governance issues is
illustrated by a recent study that challenges
the idea of unintended consequences of
quantitative performance evaluations. Rush-
forth and de Rijcke [2015] describe the role
of the journal impact factor in the everyday
conduct of research in two Dutch research
groups. This study is of particular interest
because it shows how this indicator is firmly
embedded in frames and interactions of re-
search groups and serves as a “judgement
device” in decisions on publication behav-
iour. Although the study does not explore
changes in research content, it introduces an
important new perspective on the relation-
ship between endogenous and exogenous
evaluations in science, and clearly demon-
strates that the impact of this relationship on
research content could be identified.
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Since no variation of governance can be observed in single-case
studies, governance is treated as a negligible background condition.
The necessity to systematically vary conditions created by gover-
nance in studies of knowledge construction points to a problem of
research capacity. The necessary depth for exploring research
content can only be reached for one case in projects conducted by
just one researcher. Second, a comparative approach would neces-
sarily include the comparison of research practices and research
content across fields. This poses interesting challenges to sts [Laudel
and Gl€aser 2014; Gl€aser and Laudel 2015b] but, again, sts is the field
best equipped to meet them.
4. Conclusions
The question on which we focused this review––“How does
governance shape research content?”––is only one of many questions
investigated by science policy studies and the sociology of science,
and certainly not the most popular among these. We would neverthe-
less insist that this question is theoretically relevant to both fields
and of considerable practical importance. It is theoretically interest-
ing to science policy studies because it demands a more systematic
exploration of one of its most important dependent variables. Our
discussion of the state of the art suggests that this exploration is
likely to require a revision of both methodologies and theories
addressing the impact of specific practices and instruments of
governance on research content.
Our research question is also theoretically important to the
sociology of science because, a few interesting attempts to develop
a political sociology of science notwithstanding, the field still appears
to be bifurcated in the investigation of the political effects of science,
on the one hand and laboratory studies that largely ignore political
influences on science, on the other hand. We note a particular
absence of knowledge that needs to be overcome by a specific
research agenda.
The practical importance is illustrated by studies that do contrib-
ute to our research question. All political actors with an interest
concerning the directions, conduct or performance of science should
be interested in the effects of governance on research content. We
expect they would like to know whether governance instruments
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achieve their stated effects, what other effects they have, and how
governance could be modified to serve their interests.
As a conclusion to this review, we would like to outline a research
agenda by asking three questions. The first question addresses the
state of our knowledge. What do we already know about influences of
governance on research content? The answer to this question is
somewhat disappointing. We have too few pieces of the puzzle to see
even the outline of the picture. We know that the most important channel
through which authority over research content is exercised––the
allocation of resources––is subject to a struggle between an increasing
number of actors interested in research content, and is utilised in an
increasing number of governance instruments. We know that the use of
this channel is effective—funders of research can achieve changes in
research content—and that its efficiency is reduced by window dressing.
Competition for funding appears to increase performance by way of
redistributing resources to the best performers however identified, and
may reduce the diversity of approaches and thus change the content of
knowledge production. Resource-intensive scientific innovations appear
to remain the privilege of a small scientific elite. State regulation and
privatisation of scientific knowledge may affect directions of research by
triggering an avoidance of certain topics, and may also affect the diffusion
of knowledge in scientific communities.
With few exceptions, these effects have been established on the
micro-level, and aggregate effects on the levels of national and
international scientific communities are generally under-researched.
Findings on macro-level effects are also limited in scope because they
were established for individual countries or fields, and the grounds on
which they could be generalised remain unclear.
A crucial methodological problem of studies on the effects of
specific governance instruments is produced by the fact that these
instruments always operate in complex situations, in which they
overlap with numerous other governance arrangements and non-
governance factors. This is why causal attribution of macro-level
changes in research to particular governance instruments is so
difficult. Research at the micro-level can address the complexity of
the situation but is not yet able to provide conclusions about macro-
level effects. It is also liable to idiosyncrasy because it cannot describe
research content in a framework that supports generalisation.
The limited state of our knowledge and the reasons for it we
identified in this review lead us to the second question. How can
research on the impact of governance on research content be developed?
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We do not see the necessity of adding to the list of topics raised in the
literature. Instead, we would like to emphasis two strategic tasks.
Our analysis suggests that research on the impact of governance on
research content must find ways to address the macro-micro-macro
links and the causal processes producing them. The macro-micro
link must be addressed in its full complexity. At the macro level, this
requires taking into account the embeddedness of specific gover-
nance instruments in systems of governance consisting of a multitude
of instruments and processes. At the micro-level, governance must
be studied as embedded in complex social situations to which
researchers respond. Studying consequences for the content of
knowledge at the macro-level requires considering both aggregate
and synthetic effects of micro-level changes in the production of
scientific knowledge.
Furthermore, identifying impact means establishing causality.
This requires comparative approaches for both governance and
fields. Studying the effects of one particular governance instrument
in one country cannot tell us much about the ways in which this
governance instrument changes knowledge content. We would need
to know what happens when this governance instrument is embed-
ded in a different system of governance, and what happens when it is
absent. The same strategy must be applied to fields. The epistemic
practices of researchers that governance is supposed to change vary
enormously. Again, establishing causality requires assessing the
impact of governance instruments on specific research practices,
and analysing field-specific effects. Both comparative research across
fields and the aggregation of changes in knowledge content depend
on comparable descriptions of relevant epistemic properties of fields
and knowledge. So far, we have very few tools for this, e.g. Whitley’s
[2000 [1984]] comparative framework for fields using task uncer-
tainty and mutual interdependence. Our own comparative research
has led to lists of interesting variables but not yet to a framework
[Gl€aser et al. 2010; Laudel and Gl€aser 2014; Gl€aser and Laudel
2015b]. The comparative description of field-specific conditions for and
outcomes of knowledge construction processes remains a major task on
which not only investigations of the impact of governance on research
content depend.
These strategic tasks lead us to a third question. How can such
a research agenda be realised? As an answer to this question we would
like to highlight the need for interdisciplinary collaboration and the
necessity of questioning the way in which we conduct research. Our
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review should have made clear why we think that science policy
studies and the sociology of science need to collaborate. Science policy
studies contribute their experience with the investigation of macro-
structures and of the exercise of authority over research content in
these structures. They are best equipped to investigate the first links
of the causal chain, which translate macro-level changes in governance
into changes in the situation of researchers.
The sociology of science can contribute its rich experience in
engaging with research content and its construction at the micro-
level. Researchers and research groups constitute “obligatory points
of passage” for governance because, in order to change research
content, governance must affect the choice of problems or ap-
proaches. This is the domain of sts. It has the analytical toolbox
for studying the enactment of governance in research situations and
the mutual shaping of governance and research. sts also contributes
a rich knowledge of the specificity of knowledge production pro-
cesses, and can help understand how governance instruments that
are supposed to operate across all sciences, social sciences and
humanities have field-specific effects.
A third field we believe to be necessary in this collaboration is
bibliometrics. In this review, we discussed several contributions that
demonstrate the potential of bibliometrics for contributing to the
analysis of macro-micro links (the contribution by existing scientific
knowledge to shaping the situation of researchers), micro-level
dynamics (research trajectories of individuals and groups), and
micro-macro links (the aggregation of individual processes to
macro-level knowledge dynamics). In particular, we believe that
bibliometrics is the best, if not the only, tool for analysing the
micro-macro link between individual knowledge production and the
knowledge dynamics in scientific communities. Integrating biblio-
metric methods in the research agenda outlined above can potentially
solve several of its crucial methodological problems.
Although it seems unlikely that our review could incite a “gold
rush” towards a new collaborative research enterprise between science
policy studies and the sociology of science, we believe to have
demonstrated that there is a research interest linking the two fields,
a state of the art on which we could build, and a set of difficult and
therefore exciting set of problems to be solved. We hope the
knowledge provided and the absences pointed out in this review will
contribute to creating a research agenda.
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Resume
Cet article explore les apports de deux do-
maines – les etude de politique des sciences
et la sociologie des sciences – pour la
comprehension de l’impact de la gouver-
nance sur le contenu de la connaissance
scientifique. Ces apports sont regroupes dans
deux perspectives principales, d’une part
celle dite de l’« impact de » qui cherche a
identifier les effets specifiques des dispositifs
de gouvernance, d’autre part celle dite de
l’« impact sur » qui s’interroge sur les facteurs
qui facxonnent le contenu et qui inclue la
gouvernance comme l’un de ces facteurs.
Les auteurs montrent que l’on dispose
au final que de peu de connaissances sur
l’impact de la gouvernance sur le contenu
de la science. Un agenda de recherche ne doit
pas servir necessairement a produire davan-
tage de materiau empirique mais avant tout a
saisir, dans toute sa complexite, le lien
macro-micro-macro inherent a cette ques-
tion, tout en exploitant de facxon systematique
les approches comparees pour au final etablir
la causalite. Cela suppose l’elaboration d’une
nouvelle « bo^ıte a outils » analytique, fruit
d’une collaboration interdisciplinaire a la-
quelle peuvent contribuer utilement les
etudes de politique scientifique, la sociologie
des sciences et l’approche bibliometrique.
Mots-cles : Financement fonde sur un projet
de recherche ; Financement fonde sur le
merite ; New public management ; Relations
entre universite et industrie ; Innovations
scientifiques ; Etudes de Laboratoire ; Science
non realisee ; Contenu scientifique.
Zusammenfassung
Dieser Review analysiert Beitr€age der polit-
ikwissenschaftlichen und soziologischen
Wissenschaftsforschung zu der Frage, wie
Governance Forschungsinhalte beeinflusst.
Wir gruppieren die Beitr€age unter zwei Per-
spektiven, und zwar einer ‚Einfluss von‘ –
Perspektive, die nach Effekten spezifischer
Governance-Arrangements sucht, und einer
‚Einfluss auf‘ – Perspektive, die nach Einfl€us-
sen auf die Konstruktion wissenschaftlichen
Wissens fragt und Governance als einen
solchen Einfluss einschließt. Unser Review
verdeutlicht, wie gering unsere gegenw€ar-
tiges Wissen €uber den Einfluss von Gover-
nance auf Forschungsinhalte noch ist. Eine
Forschungsagenda muss nicht unbedingt
zus€atzliche empirische Ph€anomene einschlie-
ßen. Sie muss aber die der Frage inh€arente
Makro-Mikro-Makro – Struktur in ihrer
vollen Komplexit€at adressieren und system-
atisch vergleichende Ans€atze f€ur die Etablier-
ung von Kausalit€at ausnutzen. Das erfordert
interdisziplin€are Kooperation zwischen der
politikwissenschaftlichen und soziologischen
Wissenschaftsforschung sowie der Biblio-
metrie, da alle drei Gebiete zum n€otigen
analytischen Werkzeugkasten beitragen
k€onnen.
Schlagw€orter: Drittmittelfinanzierung; Leis-
tungsorientierte Mittelvergabe; New Public
Management; Akademie-Industrie-Beziehun-
gen; Wissenschaftliche Innovationen; Labor-
studien; Nichtwissen; Forschungsinhalte.
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